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Introduction and Aim 
This research relates to computer crimes that compromise data and financial 
security, namely hacking and online fraud, focussing on offenders’ 
perceptions of victims.  Very little is known about those who commit computer 
crimes.  This is despite the increase in offending rates that have 
corresponded with the wider availability of computers to the general public 
from the 1980s and the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1991 
(Moschovitis, Poole, Schuyler, & Senft, 1999).  These technological advances 
have increased the reach of offenders as well as the vulnerability of potential 
victims.  Cybercrime offenders constitute a hidden and hard-to-access 
population.  This qualitative analysis draws from interviews with self-identified 
offenders, law enforcement officers who investigate these offences, and court 
documents.   
The aim of this study is to examine factors relating to online victimisation.  
Rational choice theory and techniques of neutralisation have been identified 
as suitable theoretical frameworks to achieve this aim.  Therefore, areas that 
are explored in this analysis include: offenders’ motivations; people or 
organisations that are targeted; rationalisations for offending based on victim 
characteristics; whether physical distance from the victim helps alleviate 
feelings of guilt; whether offenders believe that those who do not secure their 
systems or information deserve to be taken advantage of; and potential 
targets that are avoided due to an increased likelihood of detection or for 
 2 
other reasons.  This work contributes to the literature relating to online 
victimisation, providing insight through the lens of offenders, law enforcement 
officers and the judiciary.   
Nature of hacking and fraud 
Hacking, for the purpose of this research, is defined as unauthorised access 
to a computer system, regardless of the motive, or misuse of legitimate 
access to a computer system.  Misuse of legitimate access to a computer 
system, or insider abuse of access, occurs when the hacker abuses the trust 
they have been given, such as an employee or contractor accessing or 
altering an employer’s data (Shaw, Ruby, & Post, 1998).  Computer frauds 
refer to the use of information and communication technology to manipulate 
others into providing money or identity information.   
Some of the activities pursued by computer enthusiasts have been labelled as 
criminal.  One example is “hacking”, an umbrella term that, these days, 
encompasses a variety of pursuits that compromise computer security, but 
overall refers to gaining unauthorised access to a computer system with or 
without a further criminal motive (Brenner, 2007; Wall, 2007).  Once access 
has been gained hackers may obtain confidential information, such as credit 
card details, or “deface” websites.  Hackers may employ social engineering 
techniques as well as technical methods to gain access to computer systems. 
There have been a number of studies that have examined the hacker 
subculture.  For example, Meyer (1989) found that hackers had an extensive 
social network, which was used for expertise and skill advancement.  Holt 
(2007) examined how hackers learnt how through these online social 
networks, as well as through trial and error, the use of forums, and offline 
connections.  Perceived and reported motivations for hacking and computer 
fraud offences are many and varied, and hackers may be motivated by more 
than one factor.  Table 1 below summarises some of these drawn from the 
relevant literature.   
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Table 1 
Motivations Reported in the Literature 
Motivation Key cited literature 
Curiosity and self-education Barber (2001), Chantler and Broadhurst (2006), 
Jordan and Taylor (1998), Standing Committee on 
Communications (2010), Taylor (1999) 
Ecological, political and ethical activism 
(“hactivism”) 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Barber 
(2001), Chantler and Broadhurst (2006), Furnell 
(2002), Standing Committee on Communications 
(2010), Taylor (1999) 
Financial gain, such as through 
extortion, espionage or fraud 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Barber 
(2001), Chantler (1995), Chantler and Broadhurst 
(2006), Coleman (2006), Furnell (2002), Shaw et 
al. (1998), Standing Committee on 
Communications (2010) 
Feelings of power Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Jordan 
and Taylor (1998), Taylor (1999) 
Damage other countries or political 
parties, such as through information 
warfare 
Barber (2001), Berson and Denning (2011), 
Standing Committee on Communications (2010)  
Demonstrate, test and challenge skills Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Chantler 
(1995), Furnell (2002), Goode and Cruise (2006) 
Obtain social status Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Chantler 
(1995), Jordan and Taylor (1998), Standing 
Committee on Communications (2010), Taylor 
(1999) 
External pressure, such as from 
terrorism organisations or organised 
crime groups 
Chantler and Broadhurst (2006) 
Anonymise future attacks Australian Institute of Criminology (2005) 
Settle personal grievances Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Chantler 
and Broadhurst (2006), Coleman (2006), Furnell 
(2002), Shaw et al. (1998) 
Use system resources for personal use Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Taylor 
(1999) 
Fund terrorist activities or attack critical 
infrastructure for terrorism 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Furnell 
(2002), Smith et al. (2010) 
“White hat” hacking, such as testing 
computer and network security 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2005), Barber 
(2001), Jordan and Taylor (1998) 
Addictive compulsion Chantler (1995), Furnell (2002), Jordan and Taylor 
(1998), Taylor (1999) 
Be free from, or escape from, the real 
world 
Chantler (1995), Taylor (1999) 
Fun, excitement, enjoyment or pleasure Chantler (1995), Furnell (2002), Jordan and Taylor 
(1998), McQuade (2006) 
Computer fraud, for the purpose of this research, involves a large number of 
frauds that are conducted in the online environment.  Online fraud may be 
conducted to manipulate others into providing money or identity details. This 
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may use a variety of mediums, including email, social networking sites, such 
as chat or dating websites, and online trading sites (Brenner, 2007; Finch, 
2007).  There are many types of online computer frauds, including identity 
fraud, card-not-present fraud, internet auction fraud, investment fraud, 
advance fee fraud and phishing.  
There is a relationship between the two offence types considered in this study 
as hacking may facilitate fraud.  For example, hacked webservers may result 
in compromised credit card details.  Web forums provide a marketplace for 
malware (malicious software) and stolen data, as well as services such as the 
distribution of spam, web hosting and proxy services which may be used for 
fraudulent purposes (Chu, Holt, & Ahn, 2010; Franklin, Paxson, Perrig, & 
Savage, 2007; Holt & Lampke, 2010; Motoyama, McCoy, Levchenko, Savage, 
& Voelker, 2011).  Similarly, hacked emails or social media profiles may be 
used to disseminate spam spruiking fraudulent pharmaceuticals or other 
products and for the purposes of advance fee fraud.   
Multiple victims may be involved in scams, such as an individual whose 
identity or account details has been stolen, and the financial institution, 
government agency or service provider that has been duped.  The cost of 
online fraud extends beyond the direct financial loss to include loss of 
consumer confidence, lost time and the emotional impact on victims.  
Theoretical Perspectives  
Two criminological theories provide the main framework for this analysis.  
Rational choice theory assumes that offenders calculate the perceived costs 
and benefits of crime with the assumption that they seek some type of 
advantage from their actions, be it “money, sex or excitement” (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1987, p. 935).  Rational choice theory looks at how offenders in 
particular situations make these calculations (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002).  
The theory acknowledges that offenders’ perceptions of costs and benefits 
can be subjective, “constrained as they are by time, the offender’s cognitive 
abilities, and the availability of relevant information” (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, 
p. 933), and therefore may not be rational at all (Akers & Sellers, 2004).  
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Other “choice-structuring properties” (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 935) are 
offence specific.  For example, when offenders weigh up the type and amount 
of benefit likely against the perceived risk of detection and punishment, they 
take into consideration their skills and the skills needed to successfully 
commit the offence, and the availability of necessary equipment or situations 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1987).  In addition, each of these considerations may not 
have equal weight.  For example, a high likelihood of detection may be more 
influential in deterring crime than harsh punishments (Clarke, 1997). 
According to the second theory, Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of 
neutralisation, offenders learn to use techniques to justify or neutralise acts 
that might otherwise produce feelings of shame or guilt, and distinguish 
between “appropriate and inappropriate targets for… deviance” (Sykes & 
Matza, 1957, p. 666).  Matza (1990) maintained that those that commit crime 
are not fundamentally different from those that do not, in fact they spend most 
of their time behaving in a law abiding way.  Matza’s (1990) claimed that most 
delinquents drift in and out of crime, enabled by the loosening of social 
control.  The conditions that make this drift to criminal behaviour possible 
include the use of the techniques of neutralisation.  These techniques are: to 
deny responsibility; to deny injury; to deny the victim; to condemn the 
condemners; and to appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957).  
McQuade (2006, p. 141) states that “there has been extremely little empirical 
testing of established theories to explain in explicit terms why cybercrimes 
occur”.  Some exceptions are Skinner and Fream (1997), who applied 
applying social learning theory to music piracy and unauthorised computer 
access by a student population, Rogers (2001), who applied social learning 
theory and moral disengagement to hackers, and Patchin and Hinduja (2011) 
who applied general strain theory to cyberbullying.  Digital piracy has also 
been examined using low self control and social learning theory as 
frameworks (Higgins, 2004), as well as techniques of neutralisation (Higgins, 
Wolfe, & Marcum, 2008).   
Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2009) interviewed Israeli hackers, identifying while 
doing so their use of techniques of neutralisation.  Walkley (2005) discussed 
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how techniques of neutralisation may explain computer crimes but did not 
conduct an empirical test of this theory.  Interestingly, Turgeman-Goldschmidt 
(2009) and Walkley (2005) came to quite different conclusions about the 
applicability of some of Sykes and Matza’s (1957) proposed neutralisations.  
For example, Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2009) found no evidence that offenders 
engage in denial of responsibility, which was the technique of neutralisation 
that Walkley (2005) argued had the greatest support.  Pontell (2002, p. 319) 
has called for more “explanation and theory testing and ethnographic and 
descriptive study” into these types of crime in order to strengthen criminology 
as a discipline, particularly in its understanding of emerging deviant and 
criminal behaviours.   
Research Questions 
Rational choice theory and techniques of neutralisation provide frameworks 
for thinking about how offenders may go about victim selection, particularly 
who might be targeted or avoided.  For example, rational choice theory 
examines the likelihood of detection, the level of technical skills required or 
the level of anticipated benefit.  The costs to offenders are not limited to the 
punishments metered out by the criminal justice system, but could also 
include feelings of guilt or shame, which may be mediated by the internet as 
offenders are not in physical contact with victims.  Techniques of 
neutralisation may also inform target selection, as the characteristics of some 
potential victims may be more conducive to neutralisation than others.  
Therefore, with these theories in mind, the areas explored in this study 
include: 
1. What are offenders’ motivations? 
2. What people or organisations do offenders target? 
3. What people or organisations do offenders avoid? 
4. Do offenders rationalise their actions based on victim characteristics? 
5. Does physical distance from the victim help alleviate feelings of guilt? 
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6. Do offenders believe that those who do not secure their systems or 
information deserve to be taken advantage of? 
Method 
A qualitative research design was selected for its ability to provide a deep 
understanding of offending behaviour.  This study involved three stages.  The 
first stage was a qualitative analysis of court documents, in particular 
sentencing remarks and court judgments relating to prosecutions and 
extraditions involving computer fraud and unauthorised access in Australia, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America and New Zealand. A 
systematic review of legal databases was conducted to identify relevant 
cases.  Only documents available on public databases were identified and 
retrieved.  Although this resulted in a selected sample, it provides an 
illustration to explore the issues pertinent to this research.  Of the 54 cases 
included in this stage, 12 were female offenders, while the remaining 42 were 
male.  The mean age of the sample, where known (n=35), was 32.7 years, 
ranging from 18 to 50 years.  When sorted by type of offence, 44.4 per cent 
(n=24) had committed a fraud offence, 27.8 per cent (n=15) had committed a 
hacking offence, and the remaining 27.8 per cent (n=15) committed offences 
that could be classified as both hacking and fraud. 
Stage two consisted of interviews with law enforcement officers within 
computer crime or fraud specialist units from four policing agencies in 
Australia, namely the Australian Federal Police, the Queensland Police 
Service, Western Australia Police and Victoria Police.  These interviews 
focussed on officers’ experiences with, and perceptions of, offenders who 
have been identified by the criminal justice system.  The interviews were one-
on-one, open-ended and semi structured.  The interviews were broadly 
structured as follows: 
• The background of the interviewee, such as how long they had been 
with the policing agency, and their overall experience with these 
offence types; 
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• Offender characteristics, including age, gender, family status, and 
employment status;  
• Offenders’ skill, expertise and time dedicated to offending; 
• Involvement in other offence types; 
• Involvement with other offenders; 
• Initiation into, and desistance from, offending; 
• Target selection; 
• Motivations; and 
• Offenders’ reactions to law enforcement. 
The 15 law enforcement officers interviewed in stage two included 14 males 
and one female.  The interviews ranged from 32 minutes to one hour and 16 
minutes in length, with a mean time of 51 minutes. 
Stage three consisted of interviewing active and former offenders face-to-
face.  Participants were recruited within Australia using snowball sampling, a 
non-random, purposive method.  Initial recruitment used informal networks.  
Those known to the researcher who worked and/or studied in the IT industry 
were encouraged to source participants.  The benefit of such an approach is 
that such recruiters are able to assure potential participants that the 
researcher is legitimate (Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 1992).  
Participants were also encouraged to approach additional potential 
participants.  Recruitment consisted of advising potential participants about 
the research and what it entailed and providing the contact details of the 
researcher.  In this way participants self-identified as being a member of the 
target population and, by having the participant contact the researcher, meant 
that they were in control of the amount of personal information that they 
provided.  The interviews were one-on-one, open-ended and semi-structured 
based on a modified version of McAdams’ (2008) Life Story Interview.  
Additional questions enquired about the following topics: 
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• Relationships with family members, friends, significant others and other 
offenders; 
• Employment and living arrangements; 
• Time involved in offending; 
• Involvement in other illegal behaviour; 
• Experiences with the police and the criminal justice system; 
• Age when started offending; 
• How came to the decision to start offending; 
• How targets were chosen and what was gained; 
• Perceptions of getting caught and penalties; 
• How felt before, during and after offending; 
• People or organisations that would not be targeted; 
• The best and worst parts of offending; 
• Self perceptions; 
• How skills were obtained and improved; 
• The extent that offending interferes with participation in other activities; 
• When is it ok to offend and when is it not; 
• Why stopped offending and at what age (for former offenders); 
• Opinions of those who do not secure their systems or information; 
• How morally wrong/serious hacking/fraud is; 
• Whether hacking/fraud should be against the law; 
• Friends’ involvement in hacking/fraud and other types of crime; 
• How serious police officers consider hacking/fraud to be and respect 
for police; and 
• Opinion of school and education level. 
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Of the seven offenders who participated in stage three, five identified as 
hackers and two as both hackers and online fraudsters.  Five were active 
offenders and two identified themselves as former offenders.  All participants 
were male, aged between 18 and 49, with a mean age of 29.7 years at the 
time they were interviewed.  The interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two 
hours and 18 minutes in length, with a mean time of one hour and 39 minutes.   
All interviews were transcribed verbatim.  Data from the three stages were 
analysed together to identify the themes that related to victimisation and 
target selection.  Coding of the data was mainly “concept-driven” (Gibbs, 
2007, p. 44), in that the codes used primarily arose from the literature relating 
to the theories being examined.  However, “data-driven coding” or “open 
coding” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 45) was also utilised when other key themes arose 
during analysis.  NVivo, a qualitative data analysis program, was used to 
classify and sort the data according to the codes applied to see how the data 
represented the theoretical frameworks.   
Results 
Question 1: What are offenders’ motivations? 
Many motivations for offenders were identified in the data.  Financial gain 
appeared to be the logical motivation for fraud, whereby victims are 
persuaded to part with their money.  However, Braithwaite (1993) prompts us 
to question whether financial gain is in turn motivated by need, or rather by 
greed.  To distinguish between the two, offences motivated by need are 
committed by those living in poverty, however those that are motivated by 
greed, or “insatiable wants” (Braithwaite, 1993, p. 222), are crimes of the 
wealthy.   
In order to establish whether financial gain was motivated by greed or need it 
was looked at how the money was applied.  It is noted that this is a subjective 
measure, as what may be considered luxurious to some may be a necessity 
to others.  However, it was clear that in some instances financial gain was 
used to meet basic needs: 
 11 
He admitted that he had received the complainant's money and said 
that he had spent it on living expenses… That the proceeds of the 
fraud were used to meet expenses including child support payments 
(Case #21, male fraudster, age unknown). 
However it seems clear that you committed these crimes because you 
were unable to get any money from any other sources (Case #43, 
female fraudster, aged 45 at time of court appearance). 
However, there were other instances where it appeared that the gain was not 
used to meet the necessities of daily life: 
The moneys were spent on furniture ($12,000.00), motor vehicle 
repairs following two accidents ($10,000.00) and the remaining sums 
on personal expenditure such as restaurants, clothing and other items 
(Case #30, female hacker and fraudster, aged 22 at time of court 
appearance). 
At interview with the police you said you had no idea why you had 
stolen the money. You were not in financial need. You paid lump sums 
off mortgages, assisted your parents and bought things for yourself and 
gifts for others (Case #49, female fraudster, aged 32 at time of 
offence). 
On one occasion the fraud commenced as the offender was in a difficult 
financial situation, however it appeared that the offending continued beyond 
the rectification of this state: 
In June 2006, after two years in this position, [he] was in financial 
difficulties as a result of over-spending on credit card purchases… By 
the end of September 2006, after five such transactions, he had 
defrauded his employer of over $68,000, and was no longer in financial 
difficulty. In fact he had been able to spend a lot of money modifying 
his new partner's home and purchasing items for it. He ceased 
offending for about 15 months because he had all the money he 
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wanted… He resumed offending in late December 2007 (Case #46, 
male fraudster, aged 43 at time of offence). 
Law enforcement officers advised that hackers and fraudsters often differed in 
terms of motivation.  While fraudsters were always seen as being motivated 
by financial advantage, this was not always the case for hackers, although 
this appeared to be changing as hackers were identifying ways to utilise their 
skill sets for illicit gain: 
Is suppose, what they’re trying to achieve, um, yeah, typically I’d think, 
if it’s going to be an online fraud it’s going to be money based, if it’s 
going to be hacking it’s not, not financially based… I think, probably the 
most, with the hacking I would say they’re most likely to target their 
previous employment (Law Enforcement Officer #4).   
It depends what fraud you’re going into.  With hacking you might have 
an IT skill, you might want to prove yourself.  You might want to get 
even with someone at school, so you work out how to hack someone’s, 
you know, a person you don’t like, you hack into their account, get their 
email, take their email, depends what your motivation is.  The financial 
scammers, obviously they’re in it for money.  People go from never 
having committed a criminal offence in their life to full time online 
scamming without any hesitation at all.  Really there’s a distinction 
between the hacking and the socially engineered crimes (Law 
Enforcement Officer #9).  
As was identified above, one motivation for hackers was retribution or 
revenge against an employer or former employer (Case #7, male hacker, 
aged 26 at time of court appearance; Case #19, male hacker, age unknown; 
Case #25, male hacker, aged 24 at time of court appearance; Case #42, male 
hacker, age unknown) or as the result of being unsuccessful with a job 
application (Case #11, male hacker, aged 28 at time of offence).  Other 
instances of hacking were motivated by retribution against perceived 
wrongdoing by someone known to the offender, for example: 
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But, um, besides that, I have targeted a few people, not a few, just like 
one or two. Um, mainly because I didn't like them, and there was some 
other stuff that, um, caused a bit of shit between us. And I was quite 
upset with these people, so I thought, well, this is what I can do, they 
will never catch me (Interview #6, male former hacker, aged 18). 
One law enforcement officer recounted an investigation whereby the offender, 
initially motivated by changing their university grade, had then targeted those 
who had realised the error as revenge: 
…and he’s changed his marks from fails to passes and then of course, 
once he’s learnt that’s so easy, he’s been prolific... and what’s 
happened in this specific case is he’s obviously been caught, because 
they realised that marks had been changed because the administrators 
gone hang on, that student failed, why is his mark all of a sudden a 
pass mark.  And of course, that led to reporting to the police and we 
investigated it and then we charged him.  You know, he saw that as the 
professor’s fault.  You made me, it’s because of you I got charged...  
So then he started stalking the professor.  So he started stalking all the 
professors that had given evidence and all the staff that have given 
evidence in relation to this case, and to facilitate the stalking he 
compromised more accounts… And he’s using facilities like that to ring 
up and socially engineer the details of the professors, and once he’s 
got that, arrange for their phones to be disconnected and their power to 
be disconnected, so, that whole revenge motivation then comes into 
play and it’s in full swing.  You know, and he’s compromised people’s 
accounts, he’s reading all their emails, he’s sending emails, setting up 
dodgy gmail accounts in the professors’ names, signing up to websites, 
sending them emails purporting to be a professor to gain access into 
other sites, it just blew out of control (Law Enforcement Officer #8).   
Parker (1998) claimed that some hackers have extreme political views, 
including anarchist, Nazi or extreme right wing associations.  However, while 
law enforcement officers advised that there were hackers targeting site for 
political reasons, they also indicated that this was a small minority: 
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Um, look, I think it's a couple of things.  I think it's mainly for money, 
you do see the occasional hactivist group, but it very much tends to be 
monetarising that skill set.  Um, so, and, yeah, so that's the main cause 
that they come to, it's about getting the money out of the system as 
much as you can (Law Enforcement Officer #13). 
Yeah.  Look, there’s not many that’s political… you might get the odd 
one for political motivation that, you know, that send something to the 
government or do something to affect the government, or some other 
agency, body, they’ll do that for that sort of a gain (Law Enforcement 
Officer #7). 
It appeared that political ideology was overrepresented in the media 
compared to hacking for other purposes: 
Yeah.  I’d say there are political reasons.  Targeting sites… So we 
don’t have a lot of those here.  Besides what we see in the media (Law 
Enforcement Officer #4).  
Of the motivations identified in the literature, the data from these studies 
supported: to demonstrate, test and challenge skills; fun, excitement 
enjoyment or pleasure; curiosity and self-education; feelings of power; 
espionage; to obtain social status; and to anonymise further attacks.  Many 
offenders obtained more than one benefit for their offending.   
There were a number of unique motivations that were identified in this 
research, namely righting perceived unfairness, to commit further offences 
and for sexual gratification.  In the following case the offender had granted 
members of the public relief from taxation due to perceived unfairness: 
There was no financial gain to the appellant in taking this course. He 
did so because of a desire to expedite the process, a heavy workload 
and concern about suggested inconsistencies in determinations of 
applications for relief (Case #1, male hacker, age unknown). 
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One of the hackers and fraudsters interviewed also claimed that his offending 
had first begun due to apparent injustice: 
Oh.  One of the network admins at school had, what’s it called, one of 
the network admins at school had Mist on his computer, or on his 
account.  School children aren’t allowed games on their computers.  
That’s not fair, you’re playing it!  We can play it at lunchtime.  No, 
you’re not allowed it.  That’s for me.  Right.  No, it’s for everyone, it’s 
not fair.  That was the first bit… That was ah, yeah, that was the first 
time I think.  The first time I ever did something dodgy with a computer.  
And then I committed fraud on his computer, signing him up to a whole 
bunch of stuff (Interview #5, male hacker and fraudster, aged 22). 
A law enforcement officer advised how identity fraud was used to commit 
further offences, namely drug trafficking: 
Oh, yeah, I’d say drug trafficking… Well, it helps support their 
operation, those particular deceptions were used, um, more so for 
travel arrangements.  Interstate and overseas… Yeah, so the online 
fraud was used to purchase tickets to travel interstate for the purposes 
of trafficking (Law Enforcement Officer #4).   
Motivations relating to sexual gratification included hosting child exploitation 
material on compromised servers, as well as obtaining access to photographs 
and impersonating another for erotic purposes: 
He hacked in to someone’s MSN and then pretended to be the guy, 
pretended to be that person, and then was chatting to that person’s 
girlfriend, and basically it got quite lurid and stuff like that.  And the girl 
realised it wasn’t her boyfriend and backed out sort of thing (Law 
Enforcement Officer #11).   
No, they would, I suppose almost stalk, they were sending out emails 
from that account, or uploading photos or contacting other people 
requesting sexual favours.  And, even putting it politely to start with, 
yeah, it was bizarre (Law Enforcement Officer #4).   
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Question 2: What people or organisations do offenders target? 
Six main themes arose when analysing the data in relation to types of people 
or organisations that would be targeted, namely systems known to or 
accessible by the offender; companies perceived as undertaking questionable 
activities or offending ideological reasoning; those that are perceived as 
having wronged the offender; those who have known vulnerabilities or are 
perceived as being easy targets; indiscriminate targets, based on chance; and 
targets providing a high reward. 
Ease of access appeared to be a factor that explained why systems known to 
or accessible by the offender were targeted.  In some instances offenders 
acted on opportunities presented to them, for example: 
The accused was formerly a police officer and as such had authorised 
access to the […] computer system (Case #32, male hacker, age 
unknown). 
Denial of the victim was apparent when offenders targeted companies 
perceived as undertaking questionable activities or offending ideological 
reasoning: 
I suppose you’ve got anything from ideology, you know, people who 
want to stop animal testing will purposely target sites, you know, 
pharmaceutical companies and things like that.  Sort of along the same 
vein, if people who don’t believe in shooting animals, you know, will 
target a deer hunting website and graffiti that (Law Enforcement Officer 
#5). 
Law enforcement officers also stated that offenders were targeting those that 
they perceived had done them wrong: 
As far as hacking, unauthorised access, we’ve had a few where they’ve 
been ex-employees, in general the disgruntled employee’s been 
dismissed for whatever reason, uses those privileges that they have, 
the company sometimes fails to secure the network after that person 
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leaves and they just access it without authority later on.  Either using 
their own credentials or using someone else’s (Law Enforcement 
Officer #2). 
Some targets were selected because they had known technical vulnerabilities, 
thereby lessening the effort required to gain unauthorised access: 
You can target an SQL database with credit card details.  And they 
target those because they can run exploits and they can scan 
vulnerable, say, SQL database targets (Law Enforcement Officer #1). 
Offenders also admitted that they chose their targets based on the likelihood 
that their activities would go undetected: 
When you go with the bigger companies it’s easier to get what you 
want because, for the most part, they’re busier, their policies and 
procedures overlook everything.  Where smaller companies tend to 
have more of a wire tooth comb policy.  You know, they go through 
everything a little further.  So it’s easier to deal with something big or 
something like that (Interview #1, male hacker and fraudster, aged 27). 
Some targets were obtained by chance, with the internet allowing offenders to 
obtain a large number of targets with little cost in terms of time or involvement: 
I think, what we find online is that they target so many people and so 
rapidly and economically, it doesn’t cost you any more to hit one than 
to hit thousands, it’s almost a scattergun approach.  You look at, like, 
bot herding and bot cultivation, which is the biggest risk on the internet 
bar none, that’s very much a scattergun.  They write their bot code and 
put it on YouTube and Facebook and MP3s.  And then they just spread 
it online and see what comes back (Law Enforcement Officer #1). 
Finally, some targets were selected due to the amount of the perceived 
benefit to the offender: 
Yeah, basically I like to put it in the terms of a return on investment.  
Um, you know, we've seen countless times in logs and so forth, where 
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they talk about this account has only got ten thousand dollars in it, I 
need accounts with forty thousand dollars in it.  So, basically there's a 
cost for them to move the money and the corresponding cost if you will, 
the opportunity cost to exposing themselves to that risk of offending, so 
they are looking for a certain dollar value before they'll undertake those 
activities (Law Enforcement Officer #13). 
Question 3: What people or organisations do offenders avoid? 
Just as some targets were selected as they were seen to be deserving of 
victimisation, there was evidence that some targets were avoided if there was 
the potential for innocent parties to be harmed: 
I’ve definitely come across a couple of cases where I’ve spoken to 
people and they’ve said that they’d never do that.  You know, I 
suppose things like hacking into hospitals or medical centres, where 
people’s lives may be affected by the data, you know, medication and 
things like that (Law Enforcement Officer #5). 
Likewise, potential targets were spared if they were seen to be undeserving of 
victimisation: 
It’s not fair to kick them while they’re down though. […] you don’t have 
a deaf person that’s just had five people die and given their credit card 
number out to the funeral home and then say oh, I need a CD player, 
and then, you know, try and jack that person for it.  Um, it’s really really 
bad ethics to do it in the first place, but there’s still, there’s at least a 
little bit of honour to it (Interview #5, male hacker and fraudster, aged 
22). 
One law enforcement officer advised that offenders were not likely to victimise 
those who could potentially retaliate against them: 
I don't think they would target you know, anything that could really hurt 
them. You know, like Russian organised crime or the Chinese 
government (Law Enforcement Officer #12). 
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Similarly, another officer advised that offenders were not likely to target 
government or military sites: 
I'm pretty sure that most would steer away from .gov or .mil sort of 
things. You know, if they knew what they were doing. If they saw a 
target come up and it was like .gov or a .mil site they'd probably much 
prefer to go off to the you know, the Swedish web shop rather than the 
government installation, so there probably is a bit of self-preservation in 
there (Law Enforcement Officer #14).  
As mentioned above, one offender advised that he selected large businesses 
as fraud targets as they were less likely to detect abnormal transactions.  
Conversely, one hacker advised that he avoided large businesses as they 
were more likely to try and identify who he was: 
I would never target the government or big businesses or, I never really 
target people who know about that stuff as well, and could actually 
track me down. Like, I wouldn't target a big business because they 
obviously have the power to do something about it (Interview #6, male 
former hacker, aged 18). 
Question 4: Do offenders rationalise their actions based on victim 
characteristics? 
Offenders reportedly rationalised their actions if they perceived that there was 
little or no loss to individual victims: 
Because they know, if they rip someone off generally the banks will 
reimburse them or if they’re ripping someone off on an online auction 
site there’s Paypal.  Paypal will reimburse them.  All the big 
organisations will cop the hit, not so much the individual.  We’ve had 
some of them say in regards to those types of offences, they actually 
think they’re excuses, that they picked that site because they knew that 
site had a policy that if people would be reimbursed, so they didn’t want 
to actually target the particular victim, they just wanted the money out 
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of the site, they knew the site would reimburse the money (Law 
Enforcement Officer #2). 
Well, for a lot of credit card fraud it's, you know, the banks have got lots 
of money, the banks will give the customers the money back anyway 
so, yeah, they try to make out as if it's a victimless crime (Law 
Enforcement Officer #12). 
Another rationalisation related to the technique of neutralisation ‘appeal to 
higher loyalties’, particularly where it was seen that the offenders’ actions 
were for the common good, such as instances where there was a lack of 
transparency on behalf of the victim: 
I think the reality is that the people, the perpetrators of the problem, in 
this particular instance, the climate change debate, was the university.  
[…]  there was no free speech, […] if you’ve got something to hide, you 
know, there’s a problem there (Interview #4, male former hacker, aged 
49). 
Offenders also appealed to higher loyalties by claiming that their behaviours 
revealed vulnerabilities that would ultimately make the internet a safer place, 
for example: 
Sometimes you get that in the hacker space, i.e. yes, I committed an 
offence, but I only did it to show the world that, you know, these people 
should be more secure in the way they're doing their business kind of 
thing (Law Enforcement Officer #13).   
Another rationalisation was to condemn the condemners for the harm they 
had allegedly caused.  This rationalisation was usually ideological in nature, 
such as the following instance: 
He stated that his targets were high level US Army, Navy and Air Force 
computers and that his ultimate goal was to gain access to the US 
military classified information network. He admitted leaving a note on 
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one army computer reading: "US foreign policy is akin to government-
sponsored terrorism these days…” (Case #28, male hacker, aged 40). 
However, one officer maintained that high-level offenders operating in criminal 
syndicates did not rationalise their actions: 
Um, to be honest, most of the organised crime guys, they're not really 
looking for any justification, they're there to commit fraud to make 
money.  It's a business.  Your whole justification thing is more when 
you're moving into that kind of grey hat, you know, I'm a social activist 
who operates online kind of thing (Law Enforcement Officer #13). 
Question 5: Does physical distance from the victim help alleviate feelings of 
guilt? 
There was substantial evidence that offenders were able to resolve their 
feelings of guilt or remorse as they were not physically near their targets.  For 
example: 
A lot of the extortions and threats that you get online in the social 
networking sites, the way people talk to each other and those sorts, 
they wouldn’t say it to the person’s face.  But, because, yeah, there is 
that element of being removed.  […] they do tend to be removed from 
what they’re doing, removed from the consequences of their actions as 
well (Law Enforcement Officer #2). 
Question 6: Do offenders believe that those who do not secure their systems 
or information deserve to be taken advantage of? 
The belief that offenders who do not secure their systems or information 
deserve to be taken advantage of relates to the neutralisation technique 
‘denial of the victim’.  Offenders particularly mentioned that people or 
organisations that had lax password management, such as not changing 
default passwords, were deserving of victimisation.  The overall consensus by 
offenders could be summed up as: 
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There’s no defence really, if you’re too stupid to secure your 
information then you don’t deserve to be the custodian of that 
information (Interview #4, male former hacker, aged 49). 
Discussion  
While fraudsters are mainly motivated by financial gain, hackers enjoy a 
variety of benefits from their activities.  The data supported a number of 
benefits previously reported in the literature, as well as righting perceived 
unfairness, to commit further offences such as drug trafficking, and sexual 
gratification.  
There was little evidence that hacking was committed for purposes such as 
information warfare.  In contrast, it was found that hackers would avoid 
government and military targets in order to avoid focus on their activities.  
Whilst this may appear to contradict the wider literature which identifies these 
as potential targets (Barber, 2001; Berson & Denning, 2011), the sample 
included in this research may reflect more mainstream offenders, representing 
the majority rather than a minority of offenders with the appropriate skill, 
expertise and relevant motives for such attacks.   
One component of rational choice theory is that when offenders weigh up the 
type and amount of benefit likely against the perceived risk of detection and 
punishment, they take into consideration the skills and equipment needed to 
successfully commit the offence (Cornish & Clarke, 1987).  This analysis 
identified that types of people or organisations that were deemed to be 
suitable targets included systems familiar to or accessible by the offender and 
those that had known vulnerabilities.  This indicates that cyber crime 
offenders are targeting systems that are easily accessible and well known to 
them.  Many offenders also took steps to conceal their activities by removing 
or changing evidence that they had accessed particular systems.  There was 
some indication that offenders are calculating the risks of detection and 
punishment when selecting victims.  For example, other targets included 
those who did not have systems in place to detect fraudulent activities, further 
reducing the likelihood of detection.   
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The data indicated that offenders are employing techniques of neutralisation, 
particularly denial of the victim.  Companies perceived as undertaking 
questionable activities or offending ideological reasoning were perceived to be 
fair game.  Revenge or retribution was also a common theme that emerged in 
cases where targets were selected as they were alleged to have wronged the 
offender.  However, offenders avoided targets if they were undeserving of 
victimisation or if they were aware of potential harm arising from their actions 
that would impact innocent parties.  Other targets were selected 
indiscriminately, based on chance.  Rationalisations for offending based on 
victim characteristics were ideological in nature, including the loss impacting 
major corporations rather than individual victims.  Some offenders appealed to 
higher loyalties when hacking in order to obtain information where it was seen 
that the victim lacked transparency and the release of that information was in 
the public’s interest.  Consistent with Turgeman-Goldschmidt’s (2009) 
findings, there was little evidence that offenders engaged in denial of 
responsibility. 
This study also found that physical distance from the victim does help 
alleviate feelings of guilt and that offenders do believe that those who do not 
secure their systems or information deserve to be taken advantage of. 
Reliability, validity and reflexivity 
This section will address some of the pertinent issues relating to reliability, 
validity and reflexivity.  In relation to reliability, it is possible that the data 
obtained is not an accurate depiction, i.e. that the information provided is not 
truthful or valid.  This may occur because the participant had trouble with 
recollection, misinterpreted the question or preferred to not give an honest 
answer.  It may be asked how the researcher can believe the accounts of 
those who, due to the subject matter, may be untrustworthy.  However, Wright 
and Bennett (1990) have examined the literature relating to the truthfulness of 
accounts given by offenders during qualitative interviews.  They conclude that 
much information provided during interviews agrees with official records, and 
that, after agreeing to be interviewed, offenders perceive lying to be pointless, 
as they may as well not have consented at all.  In addition, during the 
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interviews with active and former offenders, time was spent checking for 
distortions and exploring the participants’ responses with them to seek 
clarification.  Some questions were also asked in more than one way in order 
to compare the responses.  For example, the questions ”how did you choose 
the targets that you did” and “what type of target do you avoid” are both aimed 
at examining the applicability of rational choice theory in relation to risk, 
reward and difficulty levels. 
Another problem with reliability may be “definitional drift” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 98), 
where the meanings of codes may change over time.  Notes were made 
about all the possible meanings of each code to enable a more reliable and 
stable coding system.  
The validity of the research design was improved by triangulation (Gibbs, 
2007).  The different sources of data and theories being tested allowed for two 
types of triangulation, namely “triangulation of measures”, as there are 
different methods of data collection, and “triangulation of theory”, as multiple 
theoretical perspectives have been utilised (Neuman, 2006, pp. 150-151). 
Reflexivity refers to the preconceptions and effects the researcher brings to 
the study, for example, preconceived notions of what the research will find, 
which may affect how questions are asked, or biases and experiences 
towards the subject being researched (Gibbs, 2007).  Reflexivity has gained 
much attention in qualitative studies, however this challenge to objectiveness 
may also be applied to quantitative research designs (Gibbs, 2007).  
Reflexivity may also change during the research project, as the researcher’s 
interpretations and understandings adjust to the phenomenon being studied.  
Gibbs (2007, pp. 92-93) provides some suggestions for “reflexive good 
practice”, including critically assessing the data and biases held by the 
researcher, being explicit about any theoretical models and the assumptions 
that these may hold in relation to broader values, discussing what decisions 
were made and why, and avoiding over-simplification of the data.   
 25 
Limitations of the research design 
The previous section reviewed some of the caveats relating to reliability and 
validity.  However, it is noted that other limitations may arise due to biases 
within the research design.  For example, as noted by Smith, Grabosky and 
Urbas (2004), the limitations of using court documents include the fact that 
many matters are heard in the lower courts where judgments may not be 
published, and that it is difficult to determine which matters involve computer 
crime due to the classification of offenses.  Another limitation that is relevant 
to study one is that cases brought before the courts are unlikely to be 
representative of the larger population of hackers and online fraudsters who 
are not apprehended or prosecuted.  Interviewing active and former offenders 
mitigated this limitation.   
However, the sample of active and former offenders was not chosen at 
random; therefore it may be argued that the participants are not 
representative of the offender population.  In addition, those who agree to be 
interviewed may differ from the typical offender.  Nonetheless, although this 
sample is not likely to include offenders who have worked for, or are part of, a 
terrorist organisation or organised crime syndicate, it may include more 
mainstream offenders who, collectively, may cause significant damage or fear 
of victimisation.  Again, this limitation was minimised by including offenders 
who have been identified by the criminal justice system and those who have 
not.  
Conclusion 
Offender techniques are constantly evolving, as are the technologies that 
present the opportunities to offend.  Therefore, it is argued that a strategic 
approach to crime prevention should be implemented.  This can include 
technical countermeasures, such as firewalls, anti-virus and other target 
hardening techniques.  However, in many instances the vulnerabilities exist at 
the user level, with offenders using social engineering tactics to gain access 
to systems.  Therefore, educating potential victims about computer security is 
also essential.  However, there is a large pool of susceptible targets and 
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offenders are constantly changing their methods.  Therefore it is important to 
know more about these types of offences so that alternative deterrence 
strategies can be developed.   
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